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Chile y Nueva Zelandia*
Palabras de la embajadora Rosemary Paterson
El año 2012 marca el cuadragésimo aniversario del esta-
blecimiento de las misiones diplomáticas en Chile y Nueva 
Zelandia, respectivamente, por lo que es oportuno hacer un 
balance de cómo ha evolucionado la relación y cómo esta ha 
contribuido al desarrollo de cada país.
El inicio de los años setenta fue un período importante 
para ambos países. En Nueva Zelandia obedeció a razones 
económicas; en el caso de Chile, los desafíos enfrentados 
fueron mucho más profundos.
La incorporación de Gran Bretaña a la Comunidad Econó-
mica Europea en 1973, para la cual Nueva Zelandia se había 
estado preparando desde hacía tiempo, la impulsó a buscar 
mercados alternativos para sus exportaciones. Aunque Asia 
fue, y continúa siendo, la perspectiva más atractiva para los 
exportadores neozelandeses, América Latina se mostraba 
prometedora como mercado para los productos lácteos, por lo 
que en 1972 Nueva Zelandia abrió embajadas en Chile y Perú.
El pronunciamiento militar en Chile y la dictadura posterior 
cambió el matiz de la relación y no fue hasta los años ochen-
* Con motivo de los cuarenta años de relaciones diplomáticas entre 
Chile y Nueva Zelandia, Estudios Internacionales ha creído interesan-
te dar a conocer, además de las palabras preparadas para esa oportu-
nidad por la Embajadora Rosemary Paterson, el texto de un discurso 
reciente (20 de octubre de 2011) del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 
Hon. Murray McCully, en el que se refiere a las prioridades de política 
exterior de ese país. Se incluye finalmente la intervención realizada en 
esa oportunidad por Gary Hawke, profesor emérito de la vuw. 
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ta, con Chile aún bajo régimen militar, que se realizaron las 
primeras inversiones neozelandesas significativas: en el sector 
lácteo por la New Zealand Dairy Board y en silvicultura por 
Carter Holt Harvey.
En 2012, el contexto de la comunidad internacional de 
la que son miembros Nueva Zelandia y Chile es diferente. Si 
este es el siglo de Asia Pacífico, Nueva Zelandia y Chile están 
firmemente comprometidos a ser parte de él. Mientras que en 
1972, Chile, al igual que el resto de América Latina, tenía un 
enfoque más orientado al interior, hoy se ha unido a Nueva 
Zelandia en mirar hacia la región Asia Pacífico. Al mismo 
tiempo, ambos comparten el firme compromiso de enfrentar 
los desafíos globales actuales incluyendo el cambio climático, 
la seguridad alimentaria, la protección de los recursos natu-
rales, los conflictos y la crisis financiera.
Si tuviéramos que considerar la relación entre ambos países 
centrándonos exclusivamente en cifras comerciales, podría-
mos concluir que no ha sido particularmente significativa. Al 
término del año financiero neozelandés, en junio de 2011, 
las exportaciones de Chile a Nueva Zelandia alcanzaron a 
US$50.7 millones y las de Nueva Zelandia a Chile a US$50.1 
millones. El rápido crecimiento de Chile lo ha transformado 
en un competidor para Nueva Zelandia en, por ejemplo, 
productos hortícolas y forestales, sectores en los que hubo 
inversión neozelandesa temprana en Chile.
Hoy en día, la relación económica es más sofisticada y en ella 
cabe destacar las importantes inversiones de Nueva Zelandia en 
agricultura (tanto producción como procesamiento de lácteos) y 
energía (exploración y extracción de petróleo, gas y geotermia). 
Asimismo, en estas áreas existe una significativa prestación de 
servicios por Nueva Zelandia, incluyendo educación.
El pilar fundamental de la relación es ahora el Acuerdo 
Estratégico Trans-Pacífico de Asociación Económica, o «P4» 
como se conoce comúnmente. El P4 fue negociado como un 
acuerdo de libre comercio con visión específica y la denomi-
nación de «estratégico» fue deliberada. En lo que se refiere a 
Chile y Nueva Zelandia, sin duda significó un reconocimiento 
de la prolongada relación entre los dos países,, marcada por la 
confianza y las ideas afines. Las partes, Chile, Nueva Zelandia, 
Singapur y luego Brunei, comenzaron las negociaciones cons-
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cientes de que posiblemente los beneficios tangibles a corto 
plazo de un acuerdo entre países que ya se caracterizaban por 
sus economías abiertas, no serían espectaculares. No obstante, 
estos cuatro miembros del apec esperaban que el Acuerdo, 
diseñado para permitir la adhesión de otros países, pudiera 
dar lugar a una alianza más amplia en la región.
Debido a lo anterior y al estancamiento de la ronda de 
Doha, se considera que las negociaciones de la denominada 
Asociación Trans-Pacífica (tpp) sean las más importantes 
de la actual agenda comercial y económica. Inicialmente 
agregando Australia, Perú, Estados Unidos y Vietnam a los 
cuatro miembros originales (aunque la estructura no es igual 
a una simple adhesión), Malasia se unió al grupo en 2010. 
Durante la reunión de los líderes del apec en noviembre del 
2011, Canadá, Japón y México manifestaron su intención de 
comenzar conversaciones formales con los miembros de la 
tpp, Nueva Zelandia y Chile, países pequeños y relativamente 
aislados, no pertenecen al Grupo de los 20 aunque ambos 
son miembros de la ocde y han demostrado ser capaces de 
compartir y promover una visión estratégica que está próxima 
a convertirse en realidad y que probablemente tendrá signifi-
cativo impacto en la región.
Desde un punto de vista bilateral, a nivel de gobierno, 
ambos países trabajan en una agenda muy centrada en áreas 
en que la colaboración es una clara ventaja para promover el 
crecimiento económico. Chile es país prioritario en la Estra-
tegia para América Latina del Gobierno de Nueva Zelandia, 
que establece un marco orientado a promover los vínculos 
del país con la región.
La colaboración en el área económica se centra principal-
mente en la cooperación agrícola. Lo que estamos haciendo 
en el plano bilateral refleja nuestros intereses comunes en la 
Organización Mundial del Comercio, particularmente en la 
necesidad de una mayor liberalización en el sector agrícola, 
que ambos defendemos como miembros del Grupo de Cairns. 
Chile también se sumó a la iniciativa de Nueva Zelandia y 
otros países en la reunión sobre cambio climático que tuvo 
lugar en Copenhague en el 2009, para promover el aumento 
de la producción de alimentos al mismo tiempo que reducir 
las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero: la Alianza Global 
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de Investigación. Nuestros científicos, ya bien relacionados 
entre sí, están combinando sus recursos de investigación para 
encontrar soluciones inteligentes a este problema global.
La inversión de Nueva Zelandia en la producción lechera 
de pastoreo en el sur de Chile y en la elaboración de productos 
lácteos a través de la propiedad de Soprole, se une al creciente 
interés de Chile en los servicios de capacitación agrícola que 
ofrece Nueva Zelandia. Este país es considerado un proveedor 
de categoría mundial de estos servicios y los jóvenes chilenos 
son bien acogidos en él, donde se les considera buenos tra-
bajadores deseosos de aprender técnicas que luego pondrán 
en práctica en su país de origen. Últimamente ha habido 
mayor énfasis en aplicar en Chile el modelo neozelandés de 
capacitación.
Las actividades de gobierno a gobierno en este sector se 
han definido por medio de la adopción de una agenda a corto 
plazo a nivel oficial.
En el ámbito económico y en términos más generales, los 
dos países han trabajado juntos para romper las barreras 
burocráticas, especialmente las que afectan a las Pequeñas 
y Medianas Empresas. Esta es un área de importancia tanto 
para el APEC, que propone el programa de «Facilidad para 
Hacer Negocios», como para las negociaciones del TPP donde, 
como parte del concepto de un acuerdo estilo siglo 21, existe 
preocupación por garantizar que las barreras «tras las fron-
teras» no impidan obtener los beneficios de la liberalización 
del comercio.
La cooperación entre Chile y Nueva Zelandia en materia 
de medio ambiente es de larga data. La colaboración entre 
los científicos en el campo de la biodiversidad se inició en la 
década de los años ochenta, conocida como «Conexión del 
Hemisferio Sur» (Southern Connection), que sigue activa. Los 
dos países también formaron parte del grupo del hemisferio 
sur a nivel de gobierno en el ex «Grupo de Valdivia». Hoy, 
además de la colaboración activa en los organismos multila-
terales, hay considerable actividad en el plano bilateral. Esta 
obedece en gran medida al Acuerdo de Cooperación Ambiental 
del P4 (ACA). La actividad actual de Nueva Zelandia y Chile 
se centra en el cambio climático, las energías renovables, el 
manejo del agua dulce y la biodiversidad.
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La primera misión de Nueva Zelandia en materia de co-
mercio de energía limpia e inversión llegó a Chile en marzo de 
2009 bajo el ACA. Ahora, la energía es uno de los pilares de la 
relación bilateral. La empresa neozelandesa Greymouth Petro-
leum tiene cuatro concesiones de petróleo y gas en la región de 
Magallanes. La empresa estatal Mighty River Power, que en 
Nueva Zelandia opera la mayor planta de energía geotérmica 
del mundo, ha invertido en energía geotérmica en Chile. La 
asociación geotérmica también se refleja en la investigación y la 
vinculación de las políticas públicas, así como en la prestación 
de servicios. Además, el gobierno de Nueva Zelandia ofrece 
becas a profesionales chilenos para programas de postgrado 
y técnicos en la Universidad de Auckland.
Ambos países han reconocido el potencial de la energía 
marina y con dos proyectos en marcha en Nueva Zelandia, han 
aprovechado la oportunidad para intercambiar experiencias 
a nivel de expertos.
La visita del entonces Ministro de Energía Ricardo Raineri 
a Nueva Zelandia en 2010 resultó en una declaración con-
junta sobre energía con su homólogo a la sazón, el Ministro 
Gerry Brownlee. Para poner en práctica esta declaración, los 
dos gobiernos elaboraron una agenda futura cuyas primeras 
actividades ya se han llevado a efecto.
La importancia de una gestión responsable de los recursos 
naturales del mundo ha sido durante mucho tiempo un tema 
que ha unido a Nueva Zelandia y Chile. Fue esta preocupa-
ción la que llevó a los dos países, de la mano con Australia, 
a patrocinar las negociaciones sobre la creación de la Orga-
nización Regional del Pacífico Sur de Ordenación Pesquera. 
La creación de esta Organización, una vez que el tratado 
entre en vigor, cerrará una brecha en que la explotación de 
los recursos marinos vivos en una vasta área de océano no 
estaba regulada. El tema más crítico por resolver dentro de 
este marco es el de la pesca del jurel, en peligro de extinción 
y de gran importancia económica para Chile.
Ambos países reconocen el valor del capital humano. El 
Programa de Vacaciones y Trabajo entre Nueva Zelandia y 
Chile, en vigor desde 2001, permite que mil chilenos viajen 
cada año a Nueva Zelanda para pasar sus vacaciones y al mis-
mo tiempo puedan trabajar o estudiar. Los mil cupos se llenan 
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todos los años en cuestión de horas. Por una serie de razones, 
los jóvenes neozelandeses han sido un poco más lentos para 
aprovechar esta oportunidad: en parte, se inclinan más por 
pasar de 3 a 6 meses viajando por toda América del Sur y en 
parte porque la remuneración del tipo de empleo que esperan 
obtener en este caso en el extranjero (en bares y restaurantes 
o trabajo estacional) es inferior a la que obtendrían en Nueva 
Zelandia. No obstante, los lazos entre personas están creciendo 
y el programa les da a los jóvenes una oportunidad única para 
integrarse a la cultura del otro país.
Es sorprendente que no exista más interacción en cuestio-
nes indígenas, pese a que es un área reconocida por ambos 
gobiernos e importante de fomentar a medida que avanzamos. 
El muy exitoso proyecto auspiciado por el Gobierno de Nueva 
Zelandia y el World Wildlife Fund (WFF) con la gente de Mapu 
Lahual, para promover el manejo forestal sustentable y el 
turismo en la costa de la región de Los Lagos, fue un ejemplo 
de las oportunidades que existen para ello.
En un plano más formal, la relación en educación entre los 
dos países sigue creciendo en importancia. Nueva Zelandia 
tiene experiencia de alta calidad académica en algunas áreas 
que son relevantes para Chile. Lamentablemente el convenio 
de becas, a través de Becas Chile, no ha producido todavía 
los resultados esperados. Ello se debe a varias razones, inclu-
yendo la dificultad de aplicar el sistema de clasificación a las 
universidades neozelandesas, que son más pequeñas pero a 
menudo altamente especializadas y a los continuos problemas 
burocráticos con que tropezó inicialmente el convenio. Ambos 
países reconocen que es necesario trabajar juntos para mejo-
rar la situación ya que la razón fundamental para suscribir 
el convenio es válida y el problema radica en la ejecución. 
También es importante que la forma en que se maneje el pro-
grama refuerce y no socave los fuertes vínculos ya existentes 
entre las instituciones.
El crecimiento económico requiere de inversión en inno-
vación y ciencia. El gobierno de Nueva Zelandia reconoce 
la importancia de fomentar los vínculos internacionales en 
la materia. En este sentido Chile es un país prioritario para 
Nueva Zelandia, pero es justo decir que ninguna de las partes 
está aprovechando al máximo las oportunidades disponibles, 
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excepto en los sectores de medio ambiente, energía y agríco-
la, antes mencionados. Sin embargo, este problema se está 
resolviendo mediante los fondos asignados por el gobierno 
el año pasado al intercambio científico en temas antárticos 
y energía geotérmica y la planificación de nuevos seminarios 
sobre temas relevantes.
Dos de los mecanismos utilizados para hacer frente a los 
actuales desafíos financieros mundiales son aspectos centrales 
de las políticas de Chile y Nueva Zelandia y revisten especial 
importancia para lo señalado más arriba: la reducción del 
gasto público y la creación de empleo. En el contexto de las 
relaciones internacionales, la reducción del gasto público no 
significa aislarse sino que hay que centrarse más en las activi-
dades que agregan valor y en adoptar medidas más acertadas 
para hacer el trabajo del día a día.
En la relación entre Chile y Nueva Zelandia a esto obedece 
la atención que se presta a las áreas de economía y agricultura, 
medio ambiente y energía, educación, innovación y ciencia. A 
medida que avanza el siglo de Asia Pacífico, ellas son las que 
revisten importancia en la colaboración entre nuestros dos 
países para beneficio mutuo.
Palabras del Hon. Murray McCully*
I thought I might address these challenges against the back-
ground of some of the achievements of the past three years 
–expressed of course, in an appropriately modest fashion.
May I say at the outset that despite the fact that there will 
be an election in six weeks’ time, there is nothing especially 
political about my comments today. As Foreign Minister over 
the past three years it has been my practice to avoid the un-
necessary intrusion of politics into foreign policy. By definition 
* Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Nueva Zelandia. Exposición 
realizada el 20 de octubre de 2011 en el New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs. 
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this is an area in which New Zealand’s vital economic. trade. 
security and reputational interests are at stake. The public, 
in my view, expect us to play a long game –pursuing those 
interests in a way that best accommodates bipartisanship. And 
that is what I have tried to do. Against that background. Let 
me reflect briefly on the opportunities and challenges for the 
next five years.
Our closest and most important partnership –our relation-
ship with Australia– remains unique, shaped by a deep sense 
of interdependence, shared responsibility within our region, 
and common values, underpinned by an unusual combina-
tion of mateship and a professionalism that makes domestic 
political labels irrelevant. 
It is my view that increasingly the focus of this relation-
ship will move from the things we can do between each other 
to the things we can do in other places together. Focus top 
of my list of priorities in this respect is the implementation 
of the asean Australia New Zealand fta, which places our 
two countries firmly in a free trade area of over 600 million 
people, with some of the world’s fastest growing economies.
My colleagues and I have made no secret of the fact that we 
see trade and economic objectives as paramount. If we are to 
become a wealthier country it will be because we become more 
successful in conducting trade and economic partnerships. In 
that respect we have just got lucky. For much of our history our 
geography has been our major strategic disadvantage –seeing 
us placed on the opposite side of the world from the markets 
for our goods. Now we are in the Asia Pacific Century.
Our geographical location is our advantage: on the rim 
of the region that will be the powerhouse of world economic 
growth for the foreseeable future, and providing increasing 
numbers of middle class consumers of our products. The chal-
lenge of the next few years is to turn that opportunity into 
successful functioning trading relationships.
A major piece of work in progress is the execution of the 
New Zealand Inc. strategies, committed to by this Govern-
ment in its earliest days. These are an attempt to secure an 
agreed interagency strategy in relation to our major markets 
and prospective markets, including increasing private sector 
participation. Cabinet has approved in principle strategy docu-
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ments in respect of India and China, as well as an updated 
Latin America strategy. Work is substantially complete on 
strategies for the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council, 
and work continues on Australia, asean and the eu. The Prime 
Minister in two hours’ time will launch the public execution 
of the India Strategy.
There is no need for me in this audience to underline the 
success of the relationship with China –now our second largest 
trading partnership, with exports up over 166% in the past 
three years and growing this year at 10% over last year. While 
New Zealanders see this relationship predominantly through 
a trade and economic lens, China has a much broader view 
of the relationship –one that they expect us increasingly to 
reciprocate. We need to consolidate this important relationship 
over a number of different spheres, including academia, the 
arts and sport, as well as conventional trade and diplomatic 
links. Next year marks the 40th anniversary of this important 
diplomatic relationship and a good deal of thought has been 
going into refreshing the architecture of the relationship to 
mark the occasion.
In the past year we have entered a new phase in our rela-
tionship with the United States. I hope you will allow me to 
claim this as an area of modest diplomatic success. 
We welcome US re-engagement in Asia and the Pacific. This 
provides a whole new range of opportunities for cooperation 
as we carefully redefine the New Zealand/us partnership.
I have already mentioned the importance of the fta be-
tween the cer partners and asean. But that is only one of 
the significant strands to the asean relationship. Through 
the suite of annual asean-led meetings, asean has become 
a key regional broker on matters of security, diplomacy and 
trade. emphasised by the recent decisions of the United States 
and Russia to join the East Asia Summit. It has been for this 
reason that l have given the highest priority to re-energising 
the asean relationship over the past three years
Intensive work over the past few years has seen us achieve 
‘strategic partner’ status and hold the first ever asean-New 
Zeaiand Summit between asean leaders and Prime Minister 
John Key last year.
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An important challenge lies ahead in the relationship: in 
each of the next two years, the chair of asean will be held in 
capitals in which New Zealand does not have a mission– Cam-
bodia and Brunei. We have been doing some serious planning 
to make sure we can cope with that challenge
It would be hard for me to over-emphasise the importance 
the Government attaches to the asean relationship. At some 
stage in the next two years we need to consider splitting the 
current joint roles of Ambassador to Indonesia and Ambas-
sador to asean.
Elsewhere in the Asian region there are other important 
relationships: to be advanced in the years immediately ahead.
Despite setbacks in recent years, Japan continues to be a 
major economic force globally –it remains the world’s third–
largest economy. Japan is a good and longstanding friend of 
New Zealand. Next year we celebrate 60 years of diplomatic 
relations. An important political debate has commenced in 
Japan regarding the process of regional economic integration, 
including the prospect of Japan joining the tpp negotiations. 
We have already agreed to work together as aid partners in 
the Pacific and we now need to give more shape to that part-
nership. It is an area where we both have significant interests.
Korea, too, is an important focus for New Zealand. Its 
economic growth, dynamism and innovation can only impress. 
Korea and New Zealand have an important trading relation-
ship, but our ties extend beyond that to include security, 
climate change, green growth and science.
Our number one goal with Korea is to conclude our fta 
negotiations. This really would be an excellent way of marking 
next year’s 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations.
It goes without saying, I think, that India has now emerged 
as a global power, both politically and economically. lt has 
the second-highest growth rate among the world’s major 
economies, the world’s largest workforce, and a large and 
growing middle class.
Historically New Zealand has a very warm relationship 
with India and our trade is growing steadily, but we can do 
better. In particular –and I seem to have a bit of a theme going 
here– we need to give a more strategic focus to the economic 
relationship through the conclusion of an fta.
173
• D O C U M E N T O S •
You’ll be aware by now of the critical importance l place on 
our relationships within Asia. But it cannot be our only area 
of focus. This year we started negotiating on an ftawith Rus-
sia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, all countries with vast resources 
and potentially large markets for our commodity exports. We 
are making good progress and I hope we’ll be able to sign an 
agreement next year.
New Zealand´s reputation for high-quality ftas has put us 
at the head of queue of more than 20 countries seeking similar 
agreements with Russia. A similar point could be made with 
respect to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The gcc is a region 
courted by all, but selective in how it chooses to reciprocate. 
We have been able to negotiate a good-quality fta that, when 
implemented, will give us significantly improved access into 
the markets of no less than six Gulf states: Saudi Arabia. uae, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait.
Collectively these countries are our seventh target trading 
partner, and with better market access we can take that rela-
tionship a lot further. I am delighted that my colleague Sheikh 
Abdullah, Foreign Minister to the uae, is in New Zealand 
right now –his second visit in my time in this role, reflecting 
the increasing closeness of our two countries.
In these times of uncertainty in many of the world’s most 
established markets, the fast-growing economies of Latin 
America are rapidly becoming important global players. Brazil 
alone is heading towards being one of the world’s top five 
economies by 2050.
New Zealand is a natural agricultural partner for the 
countries or South America in meeting the increasing global 
demand for food. We already have some valuable links into 
the region, particularly in the dairy sector, but it is fair to say 
that we are only scratching the surface.
One of the keys to taking things further is better air links. 
These in themselves are an area of opportunity for us. There 
is a real opportunity for New Zealand to become a transport 
hub into the Latin American region, placed as we are between 
South America, Asia and Australia. This is currently a work in 
progress. I have in previous addresses to this organization been 
clear about my ambition to see New Zealand more closely 
engage in Africa. We have laid some groundwork there with 
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the appointment of an Ambassador to the African Union. 
More diplomatic and Ministerial engagement needs to follow 
as well as effective delivery of agricultural capacity building 
from New Zealand‘s modest aid contribution in Africa.
Now, I’ve been talking a good deal today about this coun-
try’s newer economic relationships with Asia, with Russia, with 
the Middle East, with South America. But before we finish l 
want to mention some of our most established relationships, 
those within Europe.
Not only is Europe the world’s largest economic bloc and 
our third largest trading partner. It is also a vital cultural ref-
erence point for many of us. That makes it rather more than 
the sum of its parts.
While New Zealand must always be on the lookout for 
new opportunities, new partners in the fastest-growing parts 
of the globe, we will not overlook our oldest friends. Europe 
will remain integral to New Zealand’s future. In that respect 
we are looking hard at forging a new bilateral framework 
agreement that will define the future relationship between us 
and the European Union.
Finally in this rapid sweep around the world, I want to 
come home to our own part of the world, the Pacific. It has 
been no secret that I see this as a significant priority for the 
New Zealand Government.
The challenge the countries of the Pacific face is to turn a 
fairly large amount of economic potential into prosperity. I 
believe that they key to this is an increased focus on a small 
set of game-changing sectors: tourism, fishing and agriculture. 
Managed well, these can lift the Pacific to another level of 
economic development. But their ability to do so depends 
on parallel progress being made in a set of enabling sectors: 
energy, infrastructure and education.
New Zealand hosted the Pacific islands Forum in Auckland 
last month and will be Forum Chair for the next year. We were 
clear at the Forum meeting about our view of the priorities for 
the region. We have challenged the countries of the Pacific and 
our development partners in the region to match that focus.
An immediate challenge is to use our time in the Chair to 
significantly advance the region’s prospects in these key areas. 
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Critical to this process are the changes we are making to the 
aid side of the Ministry.
You will note that despite challenging fiscal times we have 
continued to increase the aid budget to $588 million this year. 
But we need to keep reducing our costs and improving our spend. 
Before I finish, there is one more foreign relations prior-
ity that l want to consider: the United Nations. You will all 
be aware that a major focus for us over the next two years 
will be our campaign for election to the Security Council in 
2015-16. It is 20 years since we were last on the Council. We 
think the time is right again to bring the perspective of a small, 
independent, principled Asia-Pacific country to the table.
Security Council reform is moving higher on the agenda. 
Rather than sitting on the sidelines we intend to be actively 
involved in that debate. But if we reform the Security Council 
to provide a longer-term role for major powers like India and 
Japan, we must also ensure a role for the small states that 
make up most of the UN’s membership. Any reform pack-
age must ensure that they, too, can contribute at the Security 
Council table. 
Today I reaffirm that New Zealand’s candidature for a seat 
at the Security Council in 2014 remains a real foreign relations 
priority for this Government. We have a tough contest with 
Turkey and Spain ahead of us, but we are receiving good sup-
port from across the UN membership. You can be sure that as 
on the sports field, New Zealand will be giving the campaign 
everything we’ve got. New Zealanders expect no less.
Intervención del professor Gary Hawke*
The global economy 
The period 2012-2017 is almost on us, and it is not very 
lengthy. Accordingly, I expect most of the big changes to be 
evident already and to have a history. You will notice that I 
* Emeritus Professor, vuw; Senior Fellow, nzier.
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am not distinguishing «changes» and «challenges» and that 
is deliberate. I would nominate as the biggest changes in New 
Zealand since I began studying its economic and social devel-
opment, especially the evolution of its public policy:
l. Changed position of women - from equal pay for equal 
work, to equal opportunities, to equal influence on determin-
ing the agenda - with the blind alley of «pay equity».
2. Changed position of Maori - genuine attempt to build 
a public life drawing on Maori as well as Pakeha elements 
despite tension between whakapapa and Pakeha Radicalism. 
3. Changed ordering and character of most important 
international relationships.
The first two owed a good deal to US leadership of the 
international community. It was not only in the US that it 
was realised how foolish it was not to take advantage of all 
the abilities of half the population, but feminism in various 
shades and forms was led from there. The connection with 
the Maori renaissance is less obvious. However, the US led the 
decolonization movement after World War ll and as it could 
hardly promote racial equality overseas but not at home, 
that led (along with the domestic history of slavery) into the 
civil rights movement which was an inspiration to Maori 
among others. Furthermore, we experienced a kind of echo as 
decolonisation of Westem Samoa and paternal development 
of territories like the Cooks and Tokelau generated some 
understanding of Maori.
However, even if the first two had a substantial internation-
al component, it is the third that is most relevant to our topic 
- both the wider topic of «The Major Economic and Foreign 
Policy Issues Facing New Zealand» and the current segment, 
«The Global Economy». Notice, it is not just ‘globalization’, 
nor is the «major challenge» managing interdependence. There 
is little that is new about that and it is change that produces 
major challenges. The challenges are keeping ideas up to date, 
and ensuring that policy is informed by sound thinking.
Since Pakeha settlement, the New Zealand economy has 
been interdependent with the international economy. Wool, 
refrigerated products (especially meat and butter and cheese), 
and a wide range of goods and services have successively been 
the main export links, but there have always been such links. 
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Unlike the case of the United States and some other large and 
mostly self-contained economies (as the US was in the mid-20th 
century although not by the end of the century) globalization 
was not a new phenomenon for New Zeland.
Yet there have certainly been recent changes. Perhaps the 
most obvious has been the intensification of international 
links. Information and communication technology has had 
a major impact. In 1840 it could take 2 years for mail with 
Britain to get replies – those were the days when it paid to 
be a govemor or even an ambassador. By the end of the 19th 
century, the telegraph had made a difference. In 1911 the in-
ternational telegraph system permitted communication around 
the world in 8 minutes. Now, it is a reasonable approximation 
to think in terms of instantaneous communication almost 
everywhere.
The usual representations of the conquest of distance by 
a globe with diminishing dimensions –and the figures I have 
quoted suggest we should start with a globe about 400 metres 
in diameter to have a globe with a diameter of a centimeter 
at the start of the twentieth century and one which is now 
without mass– while certainly dramatic, understates the ex-
tent of change. Information transmission has certainly got 
faster, but there has also been an increase in the range and 
convenience of transmission channels. The telegraph required 
specific expertise, available at a limited range of places. Even 
telephones long required specialist services until std became 
common. Now international communication by cell-phone, 
e-mail and a range of tools is available almost everywhere and 
to almost anybody without (much) specialist intervention. 
And at much less cost. 
The implications of this go beyond communication being 
easier. When as an economic historian I read official papers 
about the response of the New Zealand government to de-
velopments in the London gold market in the 1960s, I was 
impressed by how the then Department of External Affairs 
played a significant role in the discussions simply because it 
knew more than most. Its officers knew more of what was 
happening even if they had difficulty assessing the significance 
of what was happening. Now all policymaking involves com-
patibility of international and national considerations. And 
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almost all information flows directly to all policy agencies 
(and to the interested public).
Notice that while the conquest of the time needed to convey 
information over distance changed more in the nineteenth 
century than in the twentieth, the effects of wider direct access 
to international information came much later.
Furthermore, the change has not been all one way. People 
movement was in many respects easier in 1880-1914 than it is 
now. An unintended effect of the development of national wel-
fare systems was increased concern with managing immigration.
These changes have impacted on the private sector as well 
as on governments. Bank managers in the nineteenth century 
were much more autonomous, especially from overseas man-
agers, than they have become. Business networking organisa-
tions still exist but there is little value in holding international 
conferences to enable people who know one another to com-
municate among themselves. The most important effects of 
perceived change may not be the most obvious ones. 
The second big change in relations between New Zealand 
and the international economy is in the geographic nature of 
the most important relationships. We can state this as a change 
from Britain to the club of the oecd and to Asia Pacific –with 
perhaps a move to Asia being underway. But again the implica-
tions of the change soon destroy any simplicity.
Diversification was initially a strategy to manage risks –ser-
vicing more markets with a wider range of products made the 
New Zealand economy less dependent on the fortunes of a single 
economy, especially the relatively slow-growing UK economy. 
It is worth remembering that it was in the 1960s that a great 
deal of diversification of trade composition and export markets 
was achieved. (Dairy products replaced butter and cheese, forest 
products made the Australian market grow in importance, etc.) 
Diversification remains an important risk management tool, but 
diversification has no impact if all markets experience similar 
adverse trends as they did in the 1970s. Perhaps more significant, 
there is reason to suspect that world markets have become more 
interdependent over time so that individual markets are now 
less independent than they were. Diversification is then a less 
powerful risk management tool than it was.
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In what will be a continuing theme in this paper, ideas 
become outdated.
This is perhaps most evident in the field of International 
Relations, a discipline formed when it was reasonable to 
assume US domination. Now there can no doubt about the 
relative rise of China. As Hugh White has pointed out several 
times, for Australia and New Zealand this gives rise to an 
unfamiliar context – for many years we have been friends 
or allies of the dominant power in our part of the world. We 
were worried about French and even American incursions in 
the nineteenth century but generally confident in the Royal 
Navy; we were bothered by Japan but found it possible to see 
the US as a guardian (although it is worth remembering that 
Empire Loyalists and scepticism of the US did not die out im-
mediately in the 1940s.) Now our comfortable complacency is 
shaken. My friend and colleague Terence O’Brien has recently 
commented1 we live at a time when New Zealand interests 
are being fundamentally reshaped by the emergence of Asia, 
particularly China and India, and when greater immersion in 
the English-speaking world may not place New Zealand on 
the right side of history.
The familiar and comfortable are no longer the most 
important.
That is equally true of how we identify the links between 
New Zealand and the international economy. We can use 
familiar sectors and recognize the continuing importance of 
agricultural exports, but we run the risk of missing important 
changes. Agricultural and food products are less than 10% 
of total world trade, and they are slower growing than most. 
They face relatively high tariffs. We can still use traditional 
1 NZ Listener, Oct.1-7, 2011, pp. 38-39. Cf. James Ingram «A time 
for change: the US Alliance and Australian foreign policy», East Asia 
Forum, 10 August 2011 which argues for a «break from the 
‘Anglosphere’ assumption at the root of current policy, namely the 
congruence of Australian and American political and strategic goals.» 
The former Australian Ambassador, Director General of what is now 
AusAID and Executive Director of the United Nations World Food 
Programme argues that the value of US intimacy is overstated –most 
intelligence being ephemeral– and that Australia could do more to 
encourage an agreed US-China position in Asia if it had more 
credibility with China. The case is essentially that New Zealand is 
a model for Australia!.
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ideas and think that the nature of the world is not entirely 
congenial. But it would be more useful to focus on the range 
of goods and services which now constitute major links 
among’ economies. Recent fast-growing products among our 
exports include electric inductors, kraftline, buoys, beacons, 
navigational instruments, and washing machines (now almost 
traditional like aluminium). We should note, however, that 
NZ trade in goods is still concentrated – the top 25 products 
(at 6 digit ISTC level) provide 50% of exports whereas the 
world average is 29%’, and the comparable figure for China 
is 33%. Of course, we might wonder about old conventions 
of what counts as a separate product even of the SITC clas-
sification results from deliberate calibration, and we should 
not perpetuate a misplaced emphasis on goods at the expense 
of services. The typical New Zealand export may now be the 
provision of legal advice to a firm based in Singapore which 
is managing the building of a shopping centre in China, not 
the carrying of a consumer product from New Zealand to 
a foreign market. We should avoid the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness in wanting specific products and familiar pro-
cesses. Underestimating the importance of services is especially 
common. 2 Statistics NZ have recently revised New Zealand’s 
foreign investment data, but there are major problems in 
tracing flows of services, not least because transactions with 
foreign affiliates, the principal means of exporting services 
through commercial presence, are not regarded as exports 
(although they give rise to investment flows).
In the course of my discussion of how business has to 
cope with changed relative importance of different mar-
kets, I smuggled in a reference to what l think is the most 
important way in which modern globalization differs from 
earlier international interdependence. It is that links between 
producers and consumers have been supplanted by links 
among producers. Modem supply chains have been created. 
My example was legal services provided to a Singaporean 
producer of other services while the final consumer was in 
2 Cf. Jane Drake-Borckman, «The Importance of Measuring the 
Delivery of Services via Commercial Presence of offshore Foreign 
Affiliates: Some Case Studies from Australian Business Experience», 
ADBI Working Paper nº 295 (July 2011).
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China. Modern globalization creates interdependence within 
corporations – this is the significance of modem supply chain 
management. I began my studies with classic descriptions by 
people like Folke Hilgerdt and J.B. Condliffe of typical trade 
being the exchange of manufactures for food and raw mate-
rial; we became aware that from the 1950s the fastest growing 
segment was the exchange of manufactures for manufactures, 
often within a conventional sector; now we are aware of the 
importance of trade in intermediate products. And modem 
ICT means that the firms engaged in this trade are closely 
connected –they form a supply chain.
My first two big changes in New Zealand - in the position 
of women and the role of Maori - were in many respects led 
by the United States. The third, changes in relative significance 
of individual international links – is more complex. In 
intensification and in geographic distribution, the influences 
were varied, still involving significant US participation but 
perhaps not leadership. And this one, the emergence of modern 
supply chains, was led by Japan. The US and Europe joined 
an East Asian development.
Despite my example, which could be multiplied –South 
Auckland software companies using Indian technology to 
create elements of Singaporean software for sale in the United 
States (the specific New Zealand advantage being ability to 
translate between Asian mathematicians and American con-
sumers, Fonterra using New Zealand technology to sell Ameri-
can dairy products in China, New Zealand fishing companies, 
especially kiwi ventures combining with Japanese technology 
to process fish in Thailand for sale to world markets – New 
Zealand business is not as integrated into international supply 
chains as would be optimal.
We are probably all familiar now with calculations of the 
number of national economies involved in producing a «world 
car». But even economic commentary, let alone political and 
journalistic discussion, allows too little for the impact of 
supply chains. ide in Tokyo and the wto have compiled3 a 
database of trade patterns taking account of trade in interme-
diate goods. The effect is dramatic. The US deficit with China 
3 Trade Patterns and global value chains in East Asia: From trade in 
goods to trade in tasks (ide-jetro aand wto, 2011).
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becomes little more than 10% of that with Japan, and about 
a quarter of those with Korea and Germany. Unfortunately, 
New Zealand is too small to figure in the analysis, but we can 
be sure that conventional bilateral balances are misleading 
even though New Zealand’s trade policy and performance is 
such that we are insufficiently integrated with cross-border 
supply chains.
The impact of supply chains is complex. They are related to 
‘just-in-time’ manufacturing –essentially a process of manag-
ing logistics to demanding standards in order to economize 
on the cost of holding stocks, but also a way of ensuring 
that process manufacturing does not become presiding over 
routine but is attuned to solving problems since every inter-
ruption of production is a crisis –and following the Tohuku 
earthquake and tsunami there has been a lot of discussion of 
the insecurity of supply chains. In fact, most supply chains 
found alternative supplies reasonably quickly, and more im-
portant, the effect was from just-in-time manufacturing rather 
than cross-border supply chains. Had more Japanese products 
relied only on Japanese suppliers the impact they experienced 
would have been greater, not less; producers elsewhere who 
relied on Japanese suppliers would clearly have experienced 
less impact if their suppliers had been located elsewhere. But 
where will the next earthquake occur?
Research at the Economic Research Institute for asean 
and East Asia, eria, has the great merit of using micro-studies 
to explore macro-trends, and it has found several interesting 
features of Asian supply chains. In particular, there is usually 
a positive link between innovation and exporting at the firm 
level and foreign ownership is usually positive for innovative 
activity. The implication is that in the process of East Asian 
economic integration, we should look for a spread of supply 
chains to economies like those of Cambodia, Laos and Myan-
mar where they have little presence, we should look for exten-
sion beyond favoured sectors like electronics in middle-income 
economies, and we should look for innovation leadership to 
spread from high-income economies. But we have little basis 
in current experience for expecting New Zealand business to 
be significant. New Zealand business is poorly integrated into 
the supply chains where innovation will be concentrated, and 
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New Zealand public policy gives no grounds for optimism 
about future innovation.
New Zealand has experienced dramatic innovation, most 
obviously in the adoption of refrigeration at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. What was important then was finding 
breeds that satisfied consumer demand overseas, mechanisms 
for reconciling individualistic farmers with collective mar-
keting, and devices for sharing risks and rewards between 
landowners and animal managers. Learning by doing was a 
major contributor – public subsidies a minor element. The 
engineering which is so often identified with innovation was 
important but far from dominant. 
Mechanization is easily seen and appreciated, more than 
aspects of innovation which may be more important. Fur-
thermore, it is a source of productivity growth that has been 
relatively readily available. That kind of technology which 
has been most susceptible to productive change is technology 
which is «a humanly devised means for meeting a particular 
end, whose workings and effectiveness are relatively uniform 
when employed by those skilled in the art».4 Replicability and 
uniformity are the key to innovation through mechanization. 
If we were seeking to maximise the pace of technical change, 
there is a strong case for looking to concentrate innovation 
in areas where mechanization is readily possible. But if we 
are looking to understand where innovation has had most 
impact on growth we will probably find that mechanization 
was only part of the innovations which were most important 
and we might be willing to conjecture that the same will be 
true in the future.
Mechanization relates to management of inanimate objects. 
Not only did New Zealand innovation depend more on how 
people behaved as managers and in institutional settings, 
but the economy depended heavily on living creatures. Even 
within living objects, achieving technical change was easier 
with plants than with animals, and while the New Zealand 
economy depended on the growth of grass, it also depended 
4 Richard R. Nelson, «The Moon and the Ghetto Revisited», paper 
presented at «Nickfest», a conference at the University of Sussex in 
honour of G.N. von Tunzelmann, March 2010, p.8.
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on management of sheep and cattle. Innovation has always 
been a challenge for New Zealand.
Innovation remains the major challenge to both New Zea-
land business and New Zealand public policy. Neither is doing 
well. Certainly, there are interesting pieces of research being 
done such as work on stem cells which holds out prospects of 
faster genetic improvement of cattle which avoids both genetic 
modification and the ethical problems of using stem cells from 
embryos or viral insertion of dna.5 But while this deals with 
innovation in animal management, note the emphasis on the 
artificially-imposed constraint of avoiding genetic modification 
–superstition promulgated by environmentalists is far more 
damaging than excessive concern with a few taniwha– and 
it starts with a «commercialization of research» framework 
rather than one of harnessing knowledge creation to economic 
and social development.
For many years, no historian of technology or innovation 
has taken seriously the idea of a linear sequence from research 
to development to technology to final product. Nate Rosen-
berg has stated the consensus:6
«we still very much exaggerate the extent to which new 
technology is based upon scientific research. We certainly wildly 
exaggerate it when we suggest, as is often suggested by the 
spokesmen for science in Washington, that technological change 
depends upon recent developments in science».
and this is an area where Wellington resembles Washington. 
Nevertheless it remains the basis for much of our policy in the 
area. The notion that research has primacy and a strong claim 
on public expenditure can be regarded as the biggest success 
of a PR campaign in the twentieth century as it was how Van-
nevar Bush sold continuation of Manhattan project support for 
scientists to the US Congress in the 1940s; fortunately few PR 
consultants have an atomic bomb in their armoury.7
5 Jon Morgan, «Science still the key to our future», Dom Post 14 
September, 2011, p.C3.
6 In John S.Lyons, Louis P. Cain and Samuel H. Williamson, Reflections 
on the Cliometric Revolution: Conversations with economic 
historians (London and New York: Routledge Explorations in 
Economic History, 2008), p.251.
7 The idea of a linear progression of pure science, applied science and 
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The challenges of innovation conceived as something other 
than subsidies for scientists are immense both for business and 
for public policy. They come together in modern economic 
diplomacy, still often reported as though it was the kind of 
tariff-reduction agreement which was important in the 1950s. 
Notice how seldom innovation figures in any of our discus-
sions of economic diplomacy. Or international considerations 
figure in our discussions of diplomacy other than as an El 
Dorado to be exploited. A major challenge for 2012-2017 is 
to eliminate this gap.
There is an obvious bridge for those familiar with modem 
Asian ideas of economic integration. Questions of standards 
and intellectual property regimes are central to how innova-
tion is encouraged or constrained. This has recently been well 
explored in the central case of China.8
For most economies, economic development is a matter of 
catching up with the frontier. That creates problems for any 
idea of a uniform international intellectual property regime. 
For poor countries, a weak IPR regime is optimal –to encour-
age dissemination; utilization of knowledge invented abroad 
should be preferred to incentives for innovation. Advanced 
economies will naturally prefer stronger IPR regimes. That can 
economic growth was much older, going back at least to Francis 
Bacon The Advancement of Learning (1605) but Vannevar Bush 
made it dominate policy advocacy. Note the passage in the 2010 
speech of President Obama to a White House gathering of scientists, 
«As Vannevar Bush, who served as scientific advisor to President 
Franklin Roosevelt, famously said: «Basic scientific research is 
scientific capital».
8 Dieter Ernst , Indigenous Innovation and Globalization: The 
Challenge for China’s Standardization Strategy (UC Institute on 
Global Conflict anad Cooperation and East-West Center, June 2011). 
There have of course been other departures from a concentration 
on tariffs and trade in goods, notably in recognition of the importance 
of trade in services. See Sherry Stephenson and Maryse Robert, 
«Evaluating Contributions of Regional Trade Agreements to 
Governance of Services Trade» ADBI Working Paper Nº307 (August 
2011). The adbi website links to Sherry Stephenson’s website which 
contains a paper, Sherry M. Stephenson, «Standards, Conformity 
Assessment and Developing Countries» (9 May 1997), which is a 
very useful review of the standards issue as it appeared at the end 
of the 1990s, still interesting in itself and also revealing how much 
more prominent the link to innovation has become.
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be derived as an abstract argument, or it could be deduced 
from the economic history of many countries, including the 
US, not known for its ready adoption of European copyright 
agreements in the nineteenth century.
Positioning innovation policy and efforts appropriately on 
the spectrum of initiation and adaptation is far more impor-
tant than debating whether it should be sought in incremental 
change or through «step change» achievements. Schumpeter 
found a typically memorable formulation when he said, 
«Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you 
will never get a railway thereby»9 but railways were actually 
adaptations of earlier achievements with steam engines, im-
proved construction of canals, and knowledge of the value of 
optimizing friction between wheels and carriage-ways. Most 
step changes are the result of the coming together of several 
incremental changes. Nowadays, they occur in a context of 
property rights and regulations.
Standards and Intellectual Properly regimes are intimately 
connected. Some standards may be public goods, but many are 
private property. Fundamentally, there is a tension between 
standards and innovation. Standards can freeze technology. 
On the other hand, standards define «fitness for purpose» 
and facilitate compatibility and interoperability. Furthermore, 
«the challenge for standardization now is no longer technol-
ogy alone. Equally important is the challenge to standardize 
the interactions of people who create and use the technology 
within these networks. In other words, standards need to be 
developed for the work practices and business routines that 
enable these networks to grow and adjust to changing require-
ments of technology and markets.»10 That is essentially a gen-
eralization of the point I made earlier about what was most 
important in the adaptation of refrigeration in New Zealand.
The demands of adjustrnent are enormous. One of the three 
competing 3-G standards is protected by 2000 patent families 
comprising more than 6000 patents from 50 companies and 
consortia. A smart phone involves hundreds of standards com-
ing from dozens of standards-setting organizations – camera, 
9 In 1934 in the English translation, Theory of Economic Development, 
p. 64.
10 Ernst, p. 45.
187
• D O C U M E N T O S •
video, web browser, fda, Wifi etc. Smart phones are the field 
for 8000 patents held by 41 companies11. The same influences 
which have affected globalization in general have affected the 
interdependence of different contributors to patent networks. 
A map of the research and development centres of one of the 
major Chinese ict firms identifies centres in Europe, North 
America and Asia but not New Zealand or Australia (nor 
Japan).12
We learn a great deal by considering the situation of China. 
Many in China must have been startled when after succeed-
ing in entering the wto, they found that their participation 
in the international economy was governed by lawyers and 
litigation. «Chinese firms typically pay foreign patent holders 
20-40 percent of the price of each cell phone made in China; 30 
percent for each pc; and 20-40 percent for each cnc machine 
tool» (cnc is computer numerical control).The Chinese value 
added share is usually estimated at 10-15% –Asian subcon-
tractors of multinationals do better than domestic firms.13 We 
read American complaint about stolen intellectual property 
but the biggest engine of change in China is the challenge to 
legitimate Chinese business –legal Chinese handset producers 
are under attack from illegal producers of Shanzhai handsets. 14
In any case, we hear far less about commitments by firms 
and the governments of advanced economies to ensure «Fair, 
Reasonable and non-Discriminatory» access to standards and 
patents that are essential for China’s continuing development. 
«Technology transfer» is still widely understood in New 
Zealand as it was used in the 1960s, to refer to official aid. 
It now relates to the terms of participation in international 
supply chains.
It is easy to think that the existing American, European 
and Japanese provisions for standards and patents constitute 
11 Ernst, p. 44.
12 Ernst, p.46.
13 Ernst, p.51.
14 Ernst, p.82. An earlier example of the same process by which the 
balance of interests between tolerance of imitation and protection 
of intellectual property moved in favour of the latter is discussed in 
David Clayton, «Trade-offs and rip-offs: imitation-led 
industrialization and the evolution of trademark law in Hong Kong», 
Australian Economic History Review 51(2) (July 2011), pp.178-198.
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the international system. But there are actually many national 
systems, and we have to get used to the point that there can 
be no international norms or systems which do not involve 
some Chinese participation. Only now are Chinese engineers 
entering «informal social peer group networks» which are 
especially important. Chinese firms are only now beginning 
to assume leadership roles in international organizations. 15 In 
Chinese thinking, «international standards» are those devel-
oped by an international organization recognized by China, 
mostly the un. «Globalstandards» are de facto recognized 
standards. They can be copied without formal adoption. «Na-
tional» standards are those which exist in China, as they are 
in other countries, but the distinction between «international» 
and «global» is not universal. Furthermore, Chinese rhetoric 
about the primacy of economic development is not merely 
«aspirational» –it is the starting point of national strategy. 
It leads into an intention to use «indigenous innovation» as 
a means for economic development. There are then many 
tensions to be managed. The place of information security 
relative to participation in global networks is one - the idea 
of controlling the internet to preserve the political elite is a 
debased view of a much more complex issue. The promotion 
of innovation as a protective device versus participation in 
global innovation processes is another.
I used to teach Russian economic history and spent a lot 
of time on the incentives issue in central planning, but even 
when the von Mises-Hayek argument about decentralized 
management of knowledge became more prominent, I came 
to think the crucial problem for central planning was its in-
ability to manage innovation. Perhaps the wheel is turning, 
as China’s efforts to reconcile «indigenous innovation» with 
globalization are strained by the simple inability of govern-
ment regulations to keep up with technical change. Just as I 
joined most economists in thinking that the Eurozone could 
not maintain itself without a fiscal instrument or genuine 
labour mobility and then came to think that Europeans had 
somehow managed to square the circle immediately before it 
all unraveled, so I now wonder whether the argument about 
15 Ernst, p. 52.
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incentives finally has relevance in Chinese management of 
innovation policy.
I wonder if New Zealand business is aware of any of this 
and of its relevance to New Zealand business? I am sure that 
the political debate about Chinese purchase of New Zealand 
dairy farms is an insignificant sideshow. I recently received an 
invitation to a dairy innovation seminar.16 The programme 
was mostly about technical innovation –making cheese with 
less salt, and so on– and there is plenty of indications of an 
assumption that innovation is a matter of «commercializing 
research», but it did have some indications of a business-led 
approach to innovation. I wish I could say the same of in-
novation policy development.
Or even trade diplomacy generally. We have a major chal-
lenge in our conventional stance of avoiding having to make 
a choice between China and the usa. We still lend to see that 
as facilitating China’s accession to familiar westem ideas of 
democracy, and then, adopting the western theory (and oc-
casional practice) of well-formulated general rules, carefully 
monitored, and implemented. It is easy to shift into rhetoric 
about it now being time for China to take over from the US 
some of the cost of providing «a long list of public goods 
that the world badly needs China to deliver at an accelerated 
rate –stability, growth, green energy, peace.»17 This distorts 
the economic terminology of public goods into «you should 
pay for what I want. I used to be able to afford it, and paid 
only for what I wanted, but there was incidental benefit to 
you, and so you now owe me.»
Not surprisingly, this is mostly treated with polite disdain. 
But it is a challenge to our approach of independent and ra-
tional choice among feasible alternatives.
The key policy issues will not arise at the level of com-
mentary, but the danger is that such commentary will create 
an unfavourable context for collaborative policymaking. 
Even some high-level commentary is introducing unwanted 
expectations. Thus a Georgetown professor included in what 
16 Dairy Innovation Summit 28-29 November 2011, www.conferenz.
co.nz/conferences/
17 David Kelly, «Stability and social governance in China», East Asia 
Forum, 13 September 2011.18.
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was mostly a balanced account of a recent incident of a bas-
ketball match in Beijing, the response to an unbalanced foul 
count, «Unfortunately, that is what you get when you play in 
China».18 Such thoughts are not uncommon but best kept to 
the trivia of sports reporting –alter all, who in 1995 would 
have thought New Zealanders would welcome appointment of 
a South African referee to the World Cup final or cartoonists 
would find an Australian response to a semifinal defeat to be 
dignified? But it was certainly taken seriously by a consul-
tant, only recently retired from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense where the positions he held included that of China 
Country Desk Officer
Unfortunately, that is what the world gets in virtually all 
realms when it deals with today’s China. Scorn for the notion 
of fair play and respect for the rules of the game is evident 
in a range of China’s dishonest and dishonorable behavior: 
unfair trade practices; currency manipulation; intellectual 
property theft; proliferation of nuclear and missile technol-
ogy and materials; environmental degradation; undermining 
of international development standards on transparency, 
accountability, and labor; support for other lawless regimes; 
baseless claims of sovereignty in the global commons; inter-
ference with freedom 19
We all get irritable. But those who engage in economic 
diplomacy need to be up to date in their identification of 
policy issues and able to see the other party’s point of view 
as well as their own.
Being up to date will require New Zealanders involved to 
avoid outdated distinctions such as separating «technical bar-
riers to trade» from the economics of cross-border business. It 
also involves discarding outdated thoughts of helping national 
smes service final consumers in export markets in favour of 
utilising eria research which suggests that SMEs  service 
which participate in international supply chains, often with 
some overseas ownership, are likely to be more innovative.
18 Victor D.Cha, «What Really Happened to the Hoyas in Beijing», 
PacNet #49A (12 September 2011).
19 Joseph A. Bosco, «Response to ‘What Really Happened to the Hoyas 
in Beijing’» PacNet#49A (12 September 2011).
191
• D O C U M E N T O S •
Whether integration is promoted through Asia Pacific 
institution or Asian processes, it will encompass not only tra-
ditional market access but a number of aspects of regulatory 
cohesion. Asian processes are likely to have a greater focus 
on infrastructure development and a greater commitment to 
narrowing development gaps. Just as «technology transfer» 
now relates more to the terms of participation in supply chains 
than to programmes of instruction within Official Develop-
ment Assistance, so narrowing development gaps will result 
from adaptation of supply chains to local circumstances and 
energizing of innovation throughout supply chains rather 
than from traditional aid. Reflections such as these make one 
think that political gridlock in the us and the rigidity of us 
«trade» diplomacy dominated by Washington lawyers and 
industrial lobbyists will give supremacy to Asian over Asia-
Pacific institutions. And that is a challenge to New Zealand 
economic and foreign policy.
In particular, I expect that there will be some rebalancing 
away from western-oriented negotiations to Asian consensus 
building. In Taipei almost exactly a year ago, I argued that 
«While the origin of apec is also contested, the strongest argu-
ment is that the key driver was a desire to link West Pacific and 
East Pacific - North-East Asia, South-East Asia and America, 
not just geographically but reconciling Asian processes of 
consensus building and western notions of reciprocity sup-
ported by binding commitment and monitoring. Managing 
the tension between consensus and commitment has been an 
enduring theme throughout the history of apec.20 Events in the 
last year have surely pointed towards questioning the western 
emphasis on concepts such as binding agreements, monitoring 
and verification, and sanctions. While many observers con-
tinue to express scepticism of «voluntary cooperation» and 
consensual objectives and peer review,21 nobody could have 
even the slightest acquaintance with recent events in Europe 
20 «Business opportunities in a World of Variable Economic 
Integration», presentation to the symposium. The Assessment on the 
WTO’s Doha Round for Economic Growth, Chung –Hua Institution 
for Economic Research in Taipei, Taipei, Noveber 25th-26th, 2010.
21 E.G. Jacob Funk Kierkegaard, «Europe’s role in global economic 
governance», East Asia FDorum (26 July 2011).
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and continue to hold an unqualified preference for black-letter 
negotiated agreements.
One-step policy formulation is illusory and dangerous. 
However, it is common and takes many forms: China will 
encounter environmental and/or governance problems; there-
fore we should maintain traditional alliances. China may 
try to take Taiwan by force; therefore we should strengthen 
the existing structure of the NZ Defence Force. Inequality is 
unfair; therefore we should adopt a New Economic Model.
We can rely on the professionalism of our principal foreign 
and economic policy officials to moderate the most extreme 
manifestations of such non-thinking, but even they are not 
immune from its seductive appeal when it arrives disguised 
in some sophisticated terminology. And we need more senior 
economic and foreign policy advisers who are really familiar 
with how the global economy is changing.
The biggest challenge of all is to recognise when ideas need 
to change. That requires good judgment about what depth of 
understanding is required – enough to drive a car, or operate 
a computer, or knowledge of the physics and engineering of 
internal combustion engine or electronics? The comfort of 
familiarity can keep ideas alive for a very long time. Con-
sider how long it took for the experience of the 1930s to be 
dethroned from dominating belief that security should be 
pursued through official controls rather than well-managed 
markets.22 The notion that government can be heated as en-
tirely an effective representative of collective well-being should 
surely have disappeared no later than the 1970s but is still 
prominent in responses to international economic problems.
More generally, a central message of economics from 
Smith to Hayek has been that we do not have to understand 
in order to have and benefit from the spontaneous order of 
the market. But a central message of Smith, Ricardo, Say, Mill, 
Mises and Hayek has been that while it may not be essential 
to understand in order to have, it very well may be essential 
to facilitate an understanding of the spontaneous order of the 
22 As can be traced in Anthony M.Endrers, Great Architects of 
International Finance: The Bretton Woods era (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2005).
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market among the population in order to sustain that order 
and realize its benefits on a wide scale. 23
And that is a major challenge for those who will be manag-
ing New Zealand’s economic policy between 2012 and 2017.
23 Peter Boettke, «A Behavioral Approach to the Political and Economic 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations», p.11 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1893144>
